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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-016

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1 June 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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**Beijing Claims No Cooperation With DPRK Nuclear Program**

SK2405075693 Seoul YONHAP in English 0744 GMT  
24 May 93

[Text] Beijing, May 24 (YONHAP)—China has not cooperated with North Korea on its nuclear program nor helped North Korea master the peaceful use of nuclear power, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said Monday in an exclusive meeting with South Korean reporters.

"To be frank with you, we don't know much about (North) Korea's nuclear capability," said Qian, who leaves for Seoul on Wednesday to become the first Chinese foreign minister ever to be an official guest of the South Korean Government.

China's position on the international sanctions that would be imposed on North Korea if it kept its present stance on the nuclear issue was clear, he said.

"Contact has already started between the United States and North Korea and negotiations are under way between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency. South Korea has proposed a high-level meeting to North Korea. I think these all are good movements," he said.

"The time-frame for President Jiang Zemin's visit to Seoul is not yet decided. During my visit, this will be discussed, along with other measures for improved relations between our two countries.

"The two nations have not yet agreed to a summit exchange program, and President Jiang has no overseas travel plan for this year."

Asked his feeling about the South Korean soldiers killed by the Chinese People's Liberation Army during the Korean war, he avoided a direct answer.

"After World War II, the Korean peninsula was cut in half as a result of the conflict of interest between the two superpowers. There were many complex causes of the war....

"Our two neighboring countries had had a long history of contacts and visits until about a century ago.... My visit to South Korea is very important because it is for the first high-level talks between the two countries after President Kim Yong-sam's inauguration in South Korea."

China's policy toward South and North Korea was for reconciliation, stability and peace, he said.

"With the geographically nearer (North) Korea, we have had many economic contacts. Likewise, we are promoting relations with South Korea for economic development, especially investment and technological cooperation," Qian said.

Asked about a pending aviation agreement between the China and South Korea, Qian expressed hope that the knotty issue of setting the traffic control transfer point would be solved by negotiation.

## NORTH KOREA

**U.S. Administration Urged To Stop 'Nuclear Threat'***SK2505213493 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1507 GMT 25 May 93*

[Text] Pyongyang, May 25 (KCNA)—Yang Un-sik, permanent chairman of the headquarters in Americas of the National Alliance for the Country's Reunification (Pom-minnyon), in a recent statement called upon all the Koreans at home and abroad and the peaceloving figures of the world to turn out to defuse the crisis of the Korean peninsula created by the U.S. "nuclear threat".

Yang Un-sik said the North was right in declaring that tolerating the "nuclear racket" and "nuclear threat" of the United States means having its sovereignty and security violated and they would never be tolerated also to defend the sovereignty of the Third World countries.

He urged the U.S. Administration to stop the "nuclear threat" to the North at once, renounce its policies of increasing tensions on the Korean peninsula and making it a nuclear base and to cooperate in realising the North-South agreement and joint declaration on denuclearization.

He also demanded that the U.S. administration put a permanent period to nuclear war exercises like the "Team Spirit", normalise diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the United States, open DPRK-U.S. high-level political talks to solve the problem of the North's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and establish true friendly relation with denuclearized, reunified Korea.

**Reportage on Happenings at Nordic Symposium****Sends Letter to U.S. Congress***SK2605111693 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1003 GMT 26 May 93*

[Text] Pyongyang, May 26 (KCNA)—The Nordic symposium on the 40th anniversary of the armistice in Korea held in Helsinki on May 15, 1993, in a letter to U.S. Congress said that if the United States really wanted peace in Asia and the world, it should fundamentally change its Korea policy of the cold war period and stop such action as military threat and economic blockade against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The United States which is most responsible for the Korean question should finally stop joint military exercises such as "Team Spirit" aggravating the situation on the Korean peninsula, replace the Korean armistice agreement with a peace agreement and completely withdraw its troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea, the letter urged, and went on:

The United States must no more obstruct the reunification of Korea but do things helpful to the efforts of the

Korean people to achieve the great unity of the whole nation and reunify the country independently and in a peaceful way.

The United States, first of all, should be conscious of its responsibility for having compelled the DPRK to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, abandon all its attempts to take "sanctions" against it over the fictitious "nuclear problem" and take the stand of settling the problem through Korea-U.S. negotiation.

The symposium expressed the hope that U.S. Congress will immediately respond to Korea-U.S. negotiation, the willingness for which was expressed by the U.S. State Department recently, and pay due attention to it and take necessary measures so as to smoothly settle all the pending problems between Korea and the United States.

**Addresses Letter to UN Security Council***SK2605111393 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1008 GMT 26 May 93*

[Text] Pyongyang, May 26 (KCNA)—The Nordic symposium on the 40th anniversary of the armistice in Korea held in Helsinki on May 15 adopted a letter addressed to the president of the U.N. Security Council.

The letter says:

"The withdrawal of the DPRK from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is not a matter to be discussed at the U.N. Security Council and there is no legal ground to adopt a 'resolution' regarding the withdrawal from the NPT," the letter said, and went on:

"We decisively reject the 'resolution' of the U.N. Security Council.

"The nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula should be solved through Korea-U.S. negotiation as the DPRK proposed, not at the U.N. Security Council. For it is the United States which has deployed a large number of nuclear weapons in South Korea, it is the U.S. which has created nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula and it is again the U.S. which instigated some officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency to deprive it of its impartiality and compelled the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT."

The U.N. Security Council should deliberate on the threat of the United States which has failed to fulfil its obligations under the treaty as a nuclear power not to proliferate nuclear weapons nor to present nuclear threat.

The letter expressed the hope that the president of the Security Council will pay due attention so that the council may not repeat its mistake of the 1950s and may withdraw the U.N. flag from South Korea.

### **Letter Sent to Other Nordic Countries**

*SK2605114193 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1019 GMT 26 May 93*

[Text] Pyongyang, May 26 (KCNA)—A letter to the governments of the Nordic countries was adopted at the Nordic symposium on the 40th anniversary of the armistice in Korea held in Helsinki on May 15.

The letter called upon the Nordic governments to raise the following fair demands to the countries concerned for a peaceful solution of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula:

- To demand that the United States, which has deployed nuclear weapons in the Southern part of the Korean peninsula and presents nuclear threat to the DPRK, withdraw its nuclear weapons and guarantee security.
- To demand that Japan stop importing plutonium and developing nuclear weapons.
- To demand that South Korea break away from the "nuclear umbrella" of the United States and stop its own development of nuclear weapons.
- To demand that the U.N. Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency uphold international justice and the principle of impartiality and revoke their unreasonable "resolutions" on the DPRK.
- To demand that the United States immediately respond to talks with the DPRK and settle the question of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful way through it.

### **U.S.'Nuclear Proliferation' Condemned**

*SK2605112693 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1026 GMT 26 May 93*

["Who Should Be Called in Question?"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 26 (KCNA)—If the United Nations Security Council respected the principle of international justice and impartiality, it should have called in question not the DPRK, a non-nuclear state, but the United States which is engaged in nuclear proliferation and is presenting nuclear threat to non-nuclear states, declares NODONG SINMUN in an article today.

The author of the article headlined "Who Should Be Called in Question?" Says:

The country that poses biggest nuclear threat to mankind today is the United States that was the first to develop and use nuclear weapons in the world and is possessed of the biggest number of them.

Now tens of thousands of nuclear weapons are deployed in the continental U.S. and the U.S. bases overseas. And it is said that it will have about 17,000 nuclear weapons easy to handle, although a nuclear arms cut is carried out.

The United States has supplied South Africa with technologies, funds and raw materials for the development of nuclear weapons and trained South African nuclear experts. And it helped Israel develop nuclear weapons.

According to a recently published report, Israel has produced 100 or 200 nuclear weapons. The United States keeps mum about Japan's stockpile of a large quantity of plutonium, the main raw material of nuclear weapons, and is encouraging it.

South Korea planned the development of nuclear weapons at the end of the 1960s and had secret confabs to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from Europe and reached already around 1975 the level of manufacturing nuclear bomb devices within nine months, if it thought needed.

The United States compelled the DPRK to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This withdrawal was an unavoidable self-defensive step taken when the DPRK could not longer fulfil its obligations under the treaty and its supreme interests were infringed upon due to the anti-DPRK campaign of the U.S. and its followers.

Now the developing countries are strongly demanding that the nuclear powers, true to their obligations under the NPT, commit themselves to non-use of nuclear weapons against the signatories of the treaty. But this is refused by the U.S. and others nuclear powers.

This tells us that they intend to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states any time.

If the UN Security Council is to fulfil its duties, it should call in question the nuclear maneuverings of the United States and its application of double-standard policy and take a proper measure against it.

### **Official Envisions PRC's Role as Showing Benefits, Losses**

*SK2705100093 Seoul YONHAP in English 0948 GMT  
27 May 93*

[Text] Seoul, May 27 (YONHAP)—China's role in solving North Korea's nuclear situation is showing Pyongyang the benefits and losses depending on whether it decides to accept international inspection on its suspected nuclear program, Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu said Thursday.

"China believes it cannot play mediator. It believes its influence on North Korea is limited," said Han in a press conference wrapping up his two meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

"But there are roles other than a mediator that China can assume. The most important among them is reminding North Korea of benefits and losses depending on whether it resolves its nuclear problem," Han said.

The two countries discussed possibility of economic sanctions on North Korea during the foreign ministers' talks, Han said, and the agreement was to stop the situation before sanction measures by the U.N. Security Council.

To talk about avoiding sanctions is impossible unless the two sides first discuss the possibility of such punitive measures, said the foreign minister.

Qian and Han had met for nearly 90 minutes Wednesday immediately after the Chinese foreign minister's arrival in Seoul to discuss North Korea's nuclear crisis.

Thursday's meeting focused on bilateral issues.

Seoul officials said in post-meeting briefing that the two countries agreed on stepped up cooperation to solve the problem before the Security Council deems it necessary to take further actions after its May 11 resolution.

The two sides also agreed on close consultation on all matters related to this issue.

"South Korea and China hardly differed in understanding and mapping solution to this issue," said Han in evaluation of his talks with Qian.

"There was hardly any part where we differed in opinion," he said, "the talks were successful and productive."

The common understanding, as Han put it, was the [as received] both Seoul and Beijing want nuclear-free Korean peninsula, ways to keep the peninsula without nuclear weapons, and removing all suspicion of nuclear development.

Shared solution was for peaceful negotiations and telling North Korea exactly what it stands to gain or lose, he said.

Asked about the prospect of resuming and continuing inter-Korean dialogue, Han said the negotiation channel cannot but be affected if North Korea does not join back the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty before the June 12 deadline when its withdrawal becomes official.

"Discontinuing the inter-Korean dialogue is one possible countermeasure," he said.

### **Daily Denounces England, France for Nuclear Dissemination**

#### **Plutonium Provided to Japan**

*SK2705063293 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0027 GMT 27 May 93*

[NODONG SINMUN 27 May commentary: "True Color as Nuclear Disseminator"]

[Text] The true colors of England and France as nuclear disseminators have been more flagrantly exposed.

According to a report, England turned over plutonium to Japan on many occasions, and will continue to do so in the future. England also plans to produce plutonium and turn it over to South Korea in accordance with a joint accord on reprocessing. It is already common knowledge that France turned over plutonium to Japan.

England and France are nations that talk loudly about nuclear nonproliferation. Their actions of turning over plutonium to Japan and planning to offer South Korea some show their remarks about nuclear nonproliferation to be hypocritical.

The actions of England and France are of a grave and dangerous nature because they bring the hotbed of nuclear war to the Far East and increase the danger for nuclear war.

It is public knowledge that Japan is frantically pushing ahead with a plot to become a nuclear power. Japan is not only capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons at any time, they have also stockpiled more plutonium than necessary. Japan is accelerating the process of becoming a nuclear power because it intends to realize its ambition for reinvasion by means of strength.

South Korea's nuclear armament is being carried out at a very dangerous stage. A nuclear bomb [haektan] producing base has been built in South Korea and suspicions that nuclear bombs are being manufactured there have increased. In addition, the project for introducing long-range nuclear delivery means is progressing vigorously.

Japan and South Korea have become the hotbed of nuclear war in the Far East both in name and reality, and because of them, the danger of nuclear war increases with each passing day. Thus, turning over materials needed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons to Japan and South Korea are acts actively instigating their nuclear armament. Such actions are a grave threat to peace and security in Asia and in the world. The problem does not end here.

England is talking about resuming nuclear tests by advocating the need for development of new nuclear weapons and France has also expressed its intention to conduct nuclear tests.

England and France, as nuclear powers, are maneuvering to fill their nuclear weapon arsenals with new nuclear weapons and to help in the nuclear armament of Japan and South Korea, thus going against the trend of nuclear disarmament.

At the same time, England and France are attempting to pressure others by picking a quarrel with them over nonexistent nuclear issues. This is indeed an arrogant and shameless act, and is an undisguised example of the application of double standards.

If the danger of nuclear war in Japan and South Korea increases to the point that nuclear war results with

irretrievable calamities for mankind, England and France will be judged as accomplices. They should be keenly aware of this.

Nuclear armament is the way to drive Japan and South Korea towards destruction. The Japanese and South Korean authorities should abandon the ambition for nuclear armament and should immediately stop the farce of bringing in plutonium from other countries.

Those who want to live in a peaceful world, free from nuclear war, should propose checking the dangerous actions of England and France and checking and frustrating the nuclear ambition of Japan and South Korea as a common task and should actively struggle for its realization.

#### **Intending To Sell to ROK**

*SK2705052893 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0501 GMT 27 May 93*

["True Color of Nuclear Propagators"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 27 (KCNA)—Britain and France have sold plutonium to Japan and are now intending to supply it to South Korea, says NODONG SINMUN today, and adds: This indicates that their noisy call for "nuclear non-proliferation" is nothing but a hypocrisy and they are zealously encouraging nuclear armament of Japan and South Korea.

The analyst notes:

The acts of Britain and France are fraught with a great danger.

Britain is hinting its resumption of nuclear test under the pretext of the need to develop new types of nuclear weapons and France, too, is revealing its design for nuclear test. They, both nuclear nations, are trying to fill their nuclear arsenals with new types of nuclear weapons and are going against the trend of the time toward nuclear disarmament, while helping Japan and South Korea in their nuclear armament. They are also attempting to put pressure on others under the pretext of a fictitious "nuclear problem". This is a too arrogant and shameless behavior and an open expression of double standard.

They must be mindful that if the danger of a nuclear war was increased by Japan and South Korea and it resulted in imposing irrevocable disasters upon humanity, they will have to face a stern judgment as conspirators.

#### **IZVESTIYA Says DPRK NPT Pullout To Encourage Other Nations**

*SK2805031293 Seoul YONHAP in English 0132 GMT  
28 May 93*

[Text] Moscow, May 28 (YONHAP)—North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

[NPT] is highly likely to stimulate nuclear ambitions of other developing countries, thus inviting a serious threat to the world peace and stability, Russian media reports said Thursday.

IZVESTIYA and other Moscow papers, noting that a "new situation" was evolving in which nuclear weapons proliferate rapidly across the world, said North Korea's decision to pull out of the NPT would have an instant effect on India, Israel and Pakistan.

But, the reports said, the most serious threat would be posed by Ukraine which owns the third biggest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world but is yet to be officially recognized as a nuclear power internationally.

The reports said Ukraine does not care for its denuclearization plan slated to be completed by 1994 and refuses to join the NPT, creating suspicion that it might be more interested in winning the status of a nuclear power.

As for Iran, the reports took notice of five nuclear research centers now under construction with the help of China and some Western countries and said Iran is likely to start to produce nuclear weapons in a few years.

Rumors are circulating that Iran is being supplied by neighboring Kazakhstan with necessary technology, a report claimed.

Russian intelligence agencies are worried that the practice of smuggling enriched uranium and plutonium out through the southern border of the Commonwealth of Independent States would increase in frequency along with a continued commercialization drive in all industrial sectors in Russia, the reports said.

A report said all former Soviet republics owning nuclear materials, except Russia, are ignoring calls for tightened control on exports of enriched uranium and plutonium.

## **SOUTH KOREA**

#### **'Closest Cooperation' Pledged With China on Nuclear Issue**

*SK2605103593 Seoul YONHAP in English 1023 GMT  
26 May 93*

[Text] Seoul, May 26 (YONHAP)—South Korea and China pledged closest cooperation yet Wednesday to resolve North Korea's nuclear crisis, agreeing that the present situation is "the most important critical point."

South Korea's Assistant Foreign Minister Sin Ki-pok, emerging from one and half hour meeting between Foreign Ministers Han Sung-chu and Qian Qichen, said they reconfirmed North Korea's nuclear development is cause to serious international concern and destabilizing factor to peace and security in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula.

"The foreign ministers of the two countries agreed that the current times is 'the most important critical point' in solving the problem and shared a same opinion that the two countries will strengthen bilateral cooperation more than ever before," Sin said.

The Chinese foreign minister has come to Seoul as the international community accelerates last minute efforts to persuade North Korea to return to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Seoul had proposed bilateral talks with Pyongyang to complement international efforts, but Han drove a strong message to North Korea through Qian that the bilateral dialogue may stop unless North Korea returns to NPT.

"We have reminded China that more stringent measures are realistically inevitable unless North Korea soon carry out its responsibilities, especially necessary steps to remain in the NPT," Sin told reporters, echoing threats of U.N.-led economic sanctions.

"We have reminded that it would be difficult to continue with South-North Korean bilateral negotiations under such circumstances," said Sin.

Seoul also pegged down the June 12 deadline for North Korea to come back to NPT, stressing that it is crucial for Pyongyang to take action before then.

North Korea announced it is bolting the NPT, and the withdrawal becomes official on June 12. The U.N. Security Council [UNSC], after much tug-of-war with China over the contents and wording, adopted a resolution May 11 urging Pyongyang to reconsider its NPT withdrawal and to comply with IAEA inspections.

Beijing, about the last remaining staunch ally to Pyongyang, abstained from voting on the resolution.

The resolution left room open for sanction measures, saying the Security Council will consider "further" actions unless there is positive progress on North Korea's part.

China, repeating its past stance, emphasized that North Korea's nuclear problem must be solved peacefully, without international sanctions, according to Sin.

Qian took note of South Korea's efforts to resolve North Korea's nuclear crisis and pledged close consultations with South Korea so that the situation will not go so far to necessitate further actions by the UNSC.

"The talks were very sincere," said Sin when asked to evaluate Wednesday's meeting.

The Han-Qian meeting was scheduled for 60 minutes but lasted half an hour longer, "reflecting the gravity of the issue at hand and depth of the discussion," Sin said.

Qian arrived earlier Wednesday and headed to the Foreign Ministry for his first session with Han. The two

officials will meet again Thursday, but the agenda then will focus on bilateral issues rather than North Korea's nuclear situation, officials here said.

### Envoy to Japan Interviewed on Nuclear Issue

SK2805063593 Seoul WOLGAN CHOSON in Korean May 93 pp 326-32

[Interview with Kong No-myong, ROK ambassador to Japan and former South Korea senior representative to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission, by Kang In-son: "North Korea Has Pulled the Safety Pin of the International Community"]

### [Text] Worst-case Scenario

[Kang In-son] Did the government anticipate North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]?

[Kong No-myong] This kind of move was included in a worst-case scenario. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection team requested an inspection after they left Vienna on 12 March 1993 and entered North Korea on 16 March. Our government expected some kind of phased response short of the North Korean reaction, but North Korea completely refused inspection from that point on. Essentially, this was a worst-case scenario that occurred one week before our government expected it.

The IAEA, in consideration of North Korea's dignity, said that they would drop the term "special" [tukpyol] and send a regular inspection team [ilban sachaldan]. North Korea was aware that this was still a de facto special inspection and used their withdrawal from the NPT as a way to avoid it.

[Kang] If North Korea has conducted reprocessing, the method by which plutonium—the fuel for creating nuclear bombs—is extracted, is it believed they are doing so in the long building that has appeared in satellite imagery of the Yongbyon Atomic Energy Research Center?

[Kong] One of the two buildings in the vicinity of the Yongbyon Atomic Energy Research Center is said to be contaminated. That facility is a radiochemical laboratory [pangsa hwahak silhomsil], and it is possible the reprocessing was done there. The IAEA inspection team said they did go into that building; however, no announcement was made about what was inside. They did say that there were indications that this facility had been used; in other words, that it was contaminated with radiation.

[Kang] Do you believe there are other facilities in addition to those that are reprocessing facilities? Some Americans have stated that it would be difficult to place reprocessing facilities underground.

[Kong] Based on what I hear from specialists, reprocessing facilities do not need to be that large and can be

hidden in underground tunnels. If that is the case, they will be difficult to find. In the case of atomic reactors, however, because they emit heat it is said to be possible to locate them by tracking the discharged heat even if they are underground.

#### North Korea's Insincere Attitude

[Kang] During the past year, you made contact with the North Koreans as the head of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission [JNCC]. You must have a multitude of feelings about your experiences. What do you think about North Korea's attitude and their strategy for nuclear development?

[Kong] First, there is a problem with North Korea's sincerity in declaring the denuclearization of North and South Korea. According to the denuclearization statement, the possession of reprocessing facilities is not allowed. That is why for the past year we have called on North Korea to destroy its reprocessing facilities. North Korea has responded with derision: "That place is a chemical laboratory. What are you talking about? The problem lies in the South. There are nuclear bases in the South, aren't there?" This is how they reply. When we ask them "Have you not admitted that you extracted several grams of plutonium?" they respond "Are we not allowed to conduct experiments?" They have continually given these insincere responses.

In a word, North Korea's attitude toward denuclearization has been to focus solely on demanding that the South denuclearize. When it comes to the North, they quibble: "We are not doing anything." Their attitude is one of suggesting nonchalantly that we move on to something else.

[Kang] Are the North Korean JNCC representatives aware of the status of nuclear development in their country? If not, do they come to the table totally ignorant?

[Kong] There is a department chief named Kim Kyong-chun in North Korea's Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry. When IAEA Director General Hans Blix visited North Korea, Kim appears to have been the person responsible for guiding him. Thus, I believe he is an expert on the subject, but he has not come to one meeting after the tenth meeting of the JNCC (18 November 1992). Only the "political foot soldiers" from the military, Foreign Ministry, and the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland have come out.

The JNCC held 13 meetings over the past year. Neither side was able to do even one reading of an inspection regime proposal. North Korea's delaying tactics were blatant. They pointed to a small anti-infiltration training exercise and said: "Dialogue cannot take place until the gas smoke has disappeared." Then they totally cut off talks, using Team Spirit as a pretext.

[Kang] When the JNCC was first launched, did you expect that the process would be this difficult and time-consuming?

[Kong] I felt that it would not be easy, so we set a deadline and worked toward at least arriving at a documented agreement. As we opened the first meeting 19 March 1992, we had a plan to draft the documentation necessary for inspections within two months at the latest and, after adopting these documents, to conduct inspections within 20 days. However, we have continually been delayed.

#### North-South Mutual Inspections and IAEA Inspections

[Kang] The problem has passed on to the international level due to the lack of results from the past year's work towards North-South mutual inspections. Does this not mean that South Korea's position concerning the North Korean nuclear issue has weakened?

[Kong] Not necessarily. From the outset, the North Korean nuclear issue has had two distinct aspects, one being the international dimension and one being the North-South dimension. Following the December 1991 conclusion of the North-South Basic Agreement and the agreement on the Joint Statement on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea entered into the IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Agreement and became subject to IAEA inspections. With the North-South Agreement, the North became subject to mutual inspections. After visiting North Korea in May 1993, IAEA Director-General Blix made the following comment as he reported on the results of his visit: "It is extremely difficult to determine the actual status of nuclear development in countries like North Korea, South Africa, and Romania that have made a certain amount of progress in this field. In cases like this, transparency on the nuclear issue must be increased through either mutual or even regional inspections that supplement IAEA inspections."

These comments indirectly support mutual inspections between North and South Korea. In a word, they call for securing a dual safety mechanism. With IAEA inspections basically being inspections only of areas reported by the country subject to inspection, they rely on sincere and honest reports and are therefore limited. Doesn't the IAEA already have the bitter experience of Iraq in this regard?

[Kang] Do you believe that North Korea refused the IAEA's request for additional inspection of two facilities at Yongbyon because decisive evidence proving their nuclear development would be revealed if they were to open the two facilities?

[Kong] One can see this either as an attempt by North Korea to conceal the truth, or it could be seen as an attempt to obtain a bargaining card by not revealing such facilities regardless of whether they have something there or not. I believe that North Korea has strived toward obtaining both effects.

[Kang] During a press conference held by the Newspaper Editors' Association in October 1992, the U.S. Ambassador to Korea at the time, Donald Gregg stated, "North Korea's nuclear development is less ominous than it was one year ago." The sudden seriousness with which the United States began to view the North Korean nuclear issue appeared to derive from IAEA inspection results that proved that the North had extracted large amounts of plutonium (through reprocessing). Even so, some still believe that the United States fabricates intelligence [chongborul chojak hada] on North Korea's nuclear issue when necessary....

[Kong] I do not know precisely upon what data Ambassador Gregg based his statement at that time. However, there was talk that the urgency of the issue had dissipated. Even then we were viewing the issue as a worst-case scenario. According to the testimony of (then director of the U.S. CIA) Gates in early 1992, North Korea was believed to be ready to put their reprocessing facility into full operation in either May or June 1992. That is the very reason why the JNCC was working to implement a mutual inspection regime by June at the latest.

When IAEA Director-General Hans Blix visited North Korea in May 1992 and reported, upon his return, that 40 percent of the interior and around 60 percent of the exterior of the reprocessing facility had been constructed, the urgency people felt diminished. Of course, even if only 40 percent of the interior had been completed the facility could still be partially operated. That is the contaminated radiology laboratory that I mentioned earlier.

#### **The World Cannot Simply Stand By**

[Kang] That being the case, are you suggesting that U.S. estimates of North Korea's nuclear development did not suddenly become pessimistic this year?

[Kong] That is correct. Although it is true that there are certain aspects of the issue that are less urgent than we believed when we thought the facility would be operational between May and June 1992, there are also other areas that have worsened. North Korea stated that in 1990 they had extracted plutonium once. Yet the results of IAEA tests of samples North Korea provided revealed that plutonium had been extracted in 1989, 1990, and 1991. Therefore, the IAEA insisted upon seeing the underground storage facilities for chemical waste in order to confirm just how much plutonium was extracted.

The IAEA also demanded samples of spent nuclear fuel. North Korea stated, however, that since the fabrication machine that is capable of extracting spent nuclear fuel from their heavy-water reactor while it is operational has broken down, inspection would only be possible after the complete shutdown of the atomic reactor. North Korea explained that while the nuclear fuel that was loaded into the reactor in 1986 when it first was put into operation is still being used, some of this fuel was removed on

occasions when the reactor broke down. North Korea says that they attempted to extract plutonium from this fuel.

North Korea says it plans on changing the fuel in May or June 1993, at which time they will shut down the reactor. They are in consultations with the IAEA on inspecting the spent nuclear fuel then. Only when this spent fuel is inspected, will we be able to determine for the first time whether North Korea is continuing to use the same fuel it initially loaded, or whether they occasionally added or removed fuel.

According to experts, fuel that has been burned for three to six months should be utilized in order to extract plutonium that is ideal for the production of an atomic bomb. If North Korea has indeed been using the same fuel since 1986, it would be difficult to extract high density plutonium with over 90 percent fissionable material.

[Kang] If we were to regard North Korea suspiciously, we could say that North Korea removed spent nuclear fuel, reprocessed it elsewhere, and is secretly storing it. If so, is it not possible that North Korea has an as yet unrevealed reprocessing facility in addition to the radiochemical laboratory in Yongbyon.

[Kong] This would be easy to verify if they were using known facilities. However, if they used other facilities, it would be difficult to track. During their last ad hoc inspection, the IAEA installed surveillance cameras (within the atomic reactor and radiochemical laboratory) and placed seals on necessary places. One of the great benefits gained from the recent inspection is that further extraction of plutonium from those particular facilities is now difficult.

[Kang] However, should North Korea withdraw from the NPT and abolish the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, then won't any further tracking of this be impossible? Will the international community allow North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and its independent nuclear development?

[Kong] The underlying basis of international politics today is that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction like nuclear and chemical weapons must be blocked. North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and independent nuclear development amounts to a challenge both to South Korea and surrounding nations as well as to the UN Security Council and the IAEA. I believe that it will be difficult for the North to maintain such a position. The world will simply not stand for it.

#### **North Korea's Nuclear Development Will Only Be a Burden to the Regime**

[Kang] From Kim Il-song's position, this is essentially a bold gamble. Couldn't North Korea's nuclear development trigger the collapse of North Korea?

[Kong] Nuclear development does not enhance the security of the North Korean regime; rather, it can only be a

burden. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is not necessarily profitable either politically or militarily. Of course, it could have a deterrent effect. However, North Korea could not threaten other countries with it.

[Kang] Recently, South Africa stated that they developed nuclear weapons and then destroyed them. The United States gives the impression of tacitly consenting to nuclear development in countries like South Africa, Israel, and Pakistan. If pressure applied to North Korea should fail to have any effect, isn't there the possibility that the United States will respond in a similar fashion?

[Kong] The situation in North Korea is different. The strategic significance is completely different, and the ramifications are enormous. Although India and Pakistan do not explicitly acknowledge that they have nuclear weapons, their weapons are used for mutual deterrence. In the case of North Korea, however, this is an international issue. If North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is overlooked, the implications for South Korea and Japan are serious. Although not explicitly stated as one, Japan has already made this a condition in negotiations for normalization of DPRK-Japan relations. In that same context, China has also consistently supported the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Should North Korea develop nuclear weapons, this would equate to a collapse of the NPT system. This is the same as pulling the safety pin from a hand grenade.

[Kang] But isn't North Korea's basic concept of nuclear weapons development a defensive objective?

[Kong] Even so, it remains a threat to the international system.

[Kang] Couldn't the international community find itself paralyzed from doing anything should North Korea adopt a strategy of uncertainty in which they continue to insist officially that they have no nuclear weapons until they have practically succeeded in nuclear development, and afterwards continue to leak information to the effect that they have "completed a nuclear weapon"? Do you feel it impossible that North Korea would be able to at least do this?

[Kong] The issue at hand is not whether North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, but rather, what its intentions are. If one believes that North Korea's intentions are to obtain a bargaining card, then all we have to do is obtain some transparency in the nuclear issue through negotiations, and decisively block North Korea's attempts. We do not desire their isolation. Through peaceful and diplomatic means we must bring North Korea into a Northeast Asian security system and free them from the need to arm themselves. By doing so, we can also lead them to opening up.

#### **China's Position Is Based on National Interests**

[Kang] What is China's position on the North Korean nuclear issue?

[Kong] China wants the North Korean nuclear issue to be resolved at the IAEA level as much as possible. Thus, it is asking for more time to convince the North before the issue is handed over to the UN Security Council. China's position is a bit complicated. First, it recognizes that only by denuclearizing the Korean peninsula can peace in Northeast Asia be maintained. If that should fail, China realizes that serious changes could occur. On the other hand, China also intends to gain influence over North Korea, so it cannot allow North Korea to become internationally isolated. The important question, however, is: Just where do China's national interests really lie?

[Kang] It appears that South Korea, Japan, and the United States have different opinions about the North Korean nuclear issue. Are there no problems in the ROK-U.S.-Japan system of cooperation?

[Kong] South Korea, the United States, and Japan are in perfect solidarity on the subject. The relationships are being meticulously maintained and thorough responses are being given. There are none of the concerns that some scholars and press are suggesting.

[Kang] Some are suggesting that if North Korea does not reverse its decision to withdraw from the NPT, we should in turn reverse our declaration to abandon reprocessing facilities and go ahead and obtain them.

[Kong] These suggestions differ from government opinion. Our government maintains the firm position that the denuclearization declaration must be maintained. Calls for our acquisition of reprocessing facilities are irresponsible and based upon narrowminded concepts that limit South Korea's national interests to the Korean peninsula. Our country has relations with 171 nations, and there are 86 foreign legations in Seoul. We must not designate this as merely a North-South issue. Instead, we must take into account the international aspects as well.

At this point in 1993, what would be the implication if we obtained reprocessing facilities? It would definitely imply that we would obtain nuclear weapons. Even if we were to say that we are extracting plutonium, there is nothing we could use it for because we do not have a high-speed breeder reactor. We must take into consideration the enormous international burden we would incur by pursuing nuclear development.

Even if we do not arm ourselves with nuclear weapons, we still have some choices. First, we can continue to receive the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. We also receive protection as a signatory of the NPT. If a member of the NPT is threatened with nuclear weapons by a third country, they receive the protection of other NPT member nations. Although some would argue that there are occasions when the U.S. national interests do not coincide with those of Korea, as long as U.S. Forces are stationed here, the U.S. nuclear umbrella hangs over

the Korean peninsula whether we want it or not. The United States would not abandon its own troops to a nuclear threat.

#### **Calls for Nuclear Sovereignty Are Detrimental**

[Kang] Of course, in the current situation, calling for nuclear sovereignty is naive and could possibly damage the national interests. However, is it not possible to think that we could obtain reprocessing capabilities for purely economic purposes as we head toward the 21st century and develop atomic reactor technology?

[Kong] An explicit call for nuclear sovereignty could be a disadvantage. If we give the impression that we have an ulterior motive, we will not be able to receive nuclear information and technology. Korea already has many atomic power generating stations, and that in itself implies substantial potential power. By 2020, a future-generation atomic reactor will emerge, at which time we will receive adequate technology to meet our needs. If we proceed faithfully according to economic objectives, we will eventually obtain reprocessing technology. Therefore, if we proceed under the justification of nuclear sovereignty and demand reprocessing technology, the only result will be that we will find ourselves caught in an invisible trap.

[Kang] JNCC Chairman Kong No-myong added: "Why North Korea would expose Yongbyon, leave traces of high-explosive tests, and even hand over plutonium samples to the IAEA that it clearly knew would reveal what they were doing is a mystery." "One might suspect that the North could intentionally be attempting to reveal its nuclear development so as to use it as a political weapon." Kong also said: "If the United Nations imposes economic sanctions, oil will be cut off and North Korea's military system will become a scrap iron dump. If the international community applies pressure using the carrot-and-stick method, North Korea will probably capitulate before economic sanctions are imposed." He noted that several carrots, such as termination of the Team Spirit exercise, need to be offered to the North. Commissioner Kong appeared confident that

the North Korean nuclear issue can be solved through consistent diplomatic pressure.

#### **Government Unable To Agree on Response to DPRK Proposal**

SK2605054593 Seoul YONHAP in English 0537 GMT 26 May 93

[Text] Seoul, May 26 (YONHAP)—South Korea decided Wednesday it needed further study before it could respond to a North Korean proposal for an exchange of presidential envoys to discuss a Seoul-Pyongyang summit.

Working-level officials from the National Unification Board, Agency for National Security Planning, and Foreign Ministry decided to first have time to analyze the background and intentions of the proposal by North Korea and sound out the United States and China before making a final decision.

The government will pay attention to China's position on the idea during a meeting between Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in the afternoon.

The government has sounded out the U.S. position through diplomatic channels particularly because Washington is to have high-level talks with Pyongyang on June 2, informed sources said.

A government source said that the South might accept a vice ministerial-level contact the North has proposed for the truce village of Panmunjom on May 31 as part of an effort to ascertain whether it was willing to solve the nuclear problem in a peaceful way.

The South will explicitly tell the North that the agenda must be limited to nuclear and related matters to prevent Pyongyang's use of delaying tactics.

Unification-related ministers were expected to meet Thursday with Unification Minister Han Wan-sang, or there might be a high-level strategic meeting, to adjust Seoul's position on the North Korean proposal and deliver a reply by Saturday, the source said.

## ROMANIA

### **Attempt To Produce Plutonium for Atomic Weapons Disclosed**

*AU2505112493 Bucharest ROMPRES in English  
0828 GMT 25 May 93*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 25/5/1993—Daily EVENIMENTUL ZILEI writes that, under Ceausescu, Romania tried to produce plutonium for the manufacturing of an atomic weapons. The newspaper recalls that in May 1989 the communist leader had made a statement that worried the foreign chancellories: "Technically, we do have the ability to manufacture atomic weapons."

According to the daily the Institute of Nuclear Power Reactors made a clandestine experiment in December 1985, the final purpose of which was the manufacturing

of the raw material for an atomic weapon. The results of the experiment were used on projecting a production capacity of one kilogram of plutonium a year.

After the December 1989 revolution, the new Romanian Government had first dissociated itself from Ceausescu's statement. However, in April 1992 a vessel was discovered at the Nuclear Research Institute in Pitesti, containing 470 millilitres of mysterious substance. It was confirmed to be the solution from which plutonium had been extracted.

The then Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan decided the fact should be reported to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency. Much to the Romanian authorities' astonishment, agency's representatives said they had been abreast of Ceausescu's efforts to make an atomic weapon.

## INDIA

**Minister Promises PLO No Nuclear Pact With Israel**

*BK2705161893 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 1530 GMT 27 May 93*

[Text] India has reiterated that upgradation of diplomatic ties with Israel will not dilute her commitment to the Palestinian cause. Speaking to newsmen in Tunis after meeting the PLO Chairman Mr. Yasir 'Arafat today, the visiting minister of state for external affairs, Mr. R.L. Bhatia, said that India's decision to upgrade ties with Israel is [intended] to play an effective role in the ongoing West Asia peace talks. He categorically denied any agreement with Israel on nuclear cooperation. Mr. Bhatia called on the Tunisian deputy minister, Mr. Ben Mustapha, and discussed bilateral and international issues.

## IRAN

**Israeli 'Allegations' Over Nuclear Activity Questioned**

*NC2105155693 Tehran ABRAR in Persian 8 May 93 p 12*

[Mohammad Reza Khodaqolipour commentary: "How Should We Confront Israel's Threats?"]

[Text] Last week, an Israeli parliamentarian called on Israel's Western allies to seize the initiative in confronting what he called Iran's "plans to manufacture nuclear arms" as soon as possible.

Israeli Labor Party politician Efrayim Sneh threatened that if the West does not think of ways to confront Iran's immense nuclear plans, Israel will think of ways to directly confront the issue itself.

This is not the first time Israeli officials have spoken of a direct confrontation with Iran and turned to their Western allies for help. The most important reason behind the constant pretexts being propounded by Israel is that the intifadah's views were influenced by Iran and that Iran seriously opposes the compromising Arab-Israeli peace process.

There is no doubt that for months now, the West and Israel have pointed the sharp blade of their propaganda at Iran. It is easy for any impartial observer to immediately discern the propaganda angle in the allegations being made against Iran.

We should determine the stance of Iranian officials in confronting these direct threats. Israel has repeatedly threatened to destroy "nuclear arms manufacturing centers" in Iran and Iranian officials too have repeatedly refuted the existence of such centers.

Competent international authorities have been informed of this.

We should identify the centers to which Israel refers and says it intends to destroy.

Doesn't Israel's insistence that nuclear arms manufacturing centers exist in Iran aim to portray Iran's peaceful nuclear activities to the world as Iran's involvement in banned nuclear activity?

What will be the reaction if, the day after Israel is certain it has told the world that our country's peaceful nuclear activities are really the manufacture of nuclear arms, it attempts an assault against our country similar to that against Iraq in the 1980's?

Have our country's military experts identified Israel's nuclear centers so that if there is an Israeli military assault, we can respond rapidly? We should avoid a conservative approach to the repeated threats by the Zionist officials and should not be content with a mere verbal confrontation. Our country's armed forces should seriously study ways to inflict reciprocal blows on Israel so that any first attack by Israel will also be its last.

## PAKISTAN

**Indian Missile Deployment on Border Causing 'Tension'**

*BK2505120293 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER in English 24 May 93 p 6*

[Editorial: "Indian missiles on border—an uncalled for provocation"]

[Text] The tension in the subcontinent has moved a few notches up with the deployment of Prithvi missiles by India along its border with Pakistan. We have not heard from official sources as to the purpose of this deployment, but one thing is certain—they are not defensive weapons as they are devices to strike targets within the range of 250 kilometre. A number of Pakistan cities of industrial and strategic significance have become vulnerable to them. India cannot claim that these additional measures are in response to the stepped up military presence on the Pakistani side of border, since this country has not made fresh deployment or reinforcements along common boundaries. The present Indian action is quite provocative in nature and does not augur well for peace and stability in the region.

We have to see the arrival of missiles in Punjab sector in the context of overall developments in this region. It is not an isolated move, but part of a grand strategy to bully our country into submission, as well as to boost the electoral fortunes of the Indian ruling party by a show of belligerence toward this country. The recent visit of Israeli Prime Minister is also a part of this game plan, since that country has been itching for long to have a go at our nuclear energy plants. That visit ties up with the US and Western alliances' plans to encircle Pakistan on all fronts.

International considerations apart, domestic situation in India is also showing disturbing trends. Many Western analysts have started making serious predictions about a decisive victory of BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] in the next polls. In order to combat the growing popularity of BJP, the Congress (I) may decide on a pre-emptive strike against a Muslim country to make inroads into militant Hindu constituency. New Delhi has already started manufacturing a series of pretexts to justify what is known as surgical operation against Pakistan's industrial and military centres.

One added reason for giving aggressive depth to its Punjab sector is the chaotic political situation and high degree of polarisation in this country caused by the dissolution of National Assembly. That may have led the Indian war lords to think that their neighbour is in a vulnerable position. It may be stressed here that with rapid advances in missile technology targets can be hit from long distances with precision to devastating effect. Full scale invasion by ground force is being increasingly avoided due to high level of losses in human life. Therefore, the possibility of what is called selective strikes by Indian forces cannot be ruled out. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for the sake of regional peace and stability for the UN and other powers interested in promoting peace to persuade India to desist from the policy of brinkmanship. India is also encouraged by the stoppage of military aid to Pakistan from Western sources, but Indian jingoists should seriously consider the possibility of making tragic miscalculations. Our country has diversified its sources of supplies since after the cold war while uncertain political situation has led to a high degree of alert in the defence establishment. Therefore, if New Delhi is tempted to launch pre-emptive strikes, it may be in for a nasty surprise. But taking a long view of the situation, one is forced to conclude that these short-sighted policies will lead to mutual destruction and endless suffering of common people on both sides of the border.

Wisdom and statesmanship demand that India remove these missiles from sensitive border areas to give the political climate in this area a measure of normalcy.

#### **Pakistani Official 'Categorically Denies' M-11 Deal**

BK2205105793 Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English, 22 May 93 pp 1, 4

[Text] Beijing—A senior Pakistani official denied Thursday that Islamabad has received M-11 missiles from China, calling reports of such transfers speculative and "motivated".

"I categorically deny that Pakistan has taken M-11 missiles," Akram Zaki, secretary-general of the country's foreign ministry, told reporters here.

"I can tell you Pakistan has not acquired them."

"Pakistan and China have a long-standing friendship and we have a relationship which also extends to the field of defence since 1963, but once China made commitments to honour the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] limit, China has strictly adhered to those commitments," Zaki said.

The M-11 surface-to-surface missiles are more accurate and mobile and fire more rapidly than the Scuds used by Iraq during the Gulf war, and China has denied selling them to Pakistan.

The two Asian countries have close relations, in part because of shared suspicions and tensions with India.

Pakistan's secretary-general foreign affairs, Akram Zaki yesterday said that Pakistan would not unilaterally sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [as published] though it wanted the South Asia to be a nuclear free zone.

He was speaking as guest speaker at a luncheon by the Foreign Correspondents Club of China at a local hotel.

He said Pakistan's proposal of declaring the South Asia as a nuclear free zone involving five nations including the former Soviet Union, the United States, China, Pakistan and India was gaining ground. He said already every country including the United States had agreed to adopt that proposal and the only country left to be convinced was India.

The Clinton administration, he said, had also realised now that NPT should be applied in the regional context and was trying to convince India to sign the regional nuclear free arrangement. He said Pakistan had no intention of acquiring nuclear arsenal and hence the idea of having a bomb was out of question.

Answering a question, he said that China's help to Pakistan in making a bomb was baseless and part of the propaganda carried out by one of its neighbours to keep its own plans of acquiring thermo-nuclear devices as indicated by the chief of the American CIA in of his [words indistinct].

Pakistan, he said, wanted peace and stability to prevail in the region so that the people could progress economically and socially and that was why it had sponsored the resolution to keep the area free of not only the nuclear weapons but also from weapons of mass destruction. He said the only country remained to be convinced about the proposal was India and he hoped that with the international on-going persecution it would agree too.

He said Pakistan was part of the ECO [Economic Cooperation Organization] which was a regional cooperation involving Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and now had been joined by seven other countries of in [as published] the former Soviet Union. He said the ECO was also a very useful regional arrangement for bringing about prosperity in the region.

Zaki said that during the past 42 years of establishment of diplomatic relations with China and Pakistan the two countries continued to have model relations in spite of the internal and international changes. He said the friendship and understanding between the two countries was conducive to the regional peace in Asia and it was the policy of the two countries to deepen it further for advancing stability and peace in the South Asia.

Pakistan he said, wanted to [words indistinct] neighbours including India, but unfortunately, the Indian government took to suppression of the spontaneous and indigenous movement in Kashmir which erupted as a result of the international developments after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. Zaki said Pakistan had been trying to engage in a constructive dialogue with India over the situation in held Kashmir as the negotiated solution was the only answer and the road to conflict and tension was not in the interest of any country. He said the Kashmir issue could be solved only in the light of the UN resolutions and as per wishes of the Kashmiris. Zaki said that should engage in constructive dialogue rather than beefing up its 450,000 strong forces

of suppression in Kashmir [sentence as published]. Now that the United States also indirectly wanted to see India involved in a dialogue in this regard, the goal seemed near, he said.

He said Pakistan was also part of the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation], a seven-member regional cooperation alliance with the same spirit of helping to evolve a peaceful atmosphere in the region.

[Words indistinct] in the baseless allegations of Pakistan's involvement in the terrorist acts in Bombay and said that interior minister of India had himself confessed that India could not find any proof of Pakistan's involvement. About some guerilla training cells in Pakistan, he said that there were a few left over as remnants of the Afghan jihad and now that Pakistan had issued ultimatum to those involved to leave Pakistan, there was every possibility of their leaving the area in peace. He said except for the odd seven hundred NGOs the rest would have to leave.

## RUSSIA

### Mayak Defense Plant Ships First Load of Plutonium to U.S.

LD2805084893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0607 GMT 28 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko]

[Text] Chelyabinsk May 28 TASS—The former super-secret nuclear defence plant "Mayak" shipped the first batch of radioactive plutonium-238 to the United States thus beginning to implement a five-year long contract with the US energy department.

Russian radioactive isotopes produced at the first Soviet nuclear enterprise in the Urals are of a higher quality than the US ones, contain more plutonium which allows to decrease the weight of space satellites.

The radioactive materials of the "Mayak" are known in over 40 countries of the world and have recently received an award of the EC manufacturers in Madrid.

The collapse of totalitarianism opened to the world the former super-secret object which produced the first Soviet a-bomb and nuclear charges for modern missiles. US experts got a chance to visit "Mayak" and arrived to a conclusion that it is more profitable for them to use Russian radioactive isotopes in space research.

### START II Criticized as Serving Only U.S. National Interests

MK2505124093 Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian  
No. 57, 25 May 93 (Signed to Press 24 May 93) p 7

[Oleg Cherkovets commentary: "It Serves the National Interests of... America"]

[Text] Is the recently signed treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons (START II) between Russia and the United States really "a historic success," as some people are inclined to call it? The reduction of the two sides' nuclear arsenals by two-thirds is the key numerical side to the treaty that really looks impressive. It is essential, however, to look more carefully at the qualitative side to the proposed cuts.

According to Iona Andronov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee, "all the land-based intercontinental missiles with multiple warheads" are to be banned under the treaty, but land-based ICBM's of this type account for 70 percent of our arsenal against slightly more than 20 percent in the United States, while 60 percent of U.S. multiwarhead missiles are submarine-based! It turns out that we are losing nearly all our arsenal of such missiles, and the opposite side only one-half.

This is where the euphoria over "the historic breakthrough to the future," "the salvation of mankind," and

other similar epithets that some politicians and journalists are in advance giving this document, ends. It is time to call a spade a spade: We may as well not see this future at all. This idea is harshly phrased, but justifiably so: national security, the security of a state are harsh things in the first place and, like Volland's [a name of the Devil in Mikhail Bulgakov's novel "The Master and Margarita"] famous salmon, may only be of "first-degree freshness" or reliability. That is to say, they are either reliably protected or not protected at all. In world politics, like in economic relations, everyone has the right and duty to take care of the national interests of his country and his people. Naturally, not at the expense of other countries or peoples. But not vice versa, either. Relying only on your partner's word of honor without receiving guarantees for the future is a disastrous path for both a merchant and a politician.

The thing is that the dismantlement of the multiwarhead ICBM's by the Russian side is not simply "a large concession." Subject to reductions on our side are all the available heavy, silo-based SS-18 missiles with multiple warheads—from six to 10 on each of them. It is well known that it is these multiwarhead weapons—the pride of our strategic forces—that the United States and its allies feared and continue to fear now. And it is not pride or the terrifying name of the "Satan" that matter, all this is much more complex and important. Owing precisely to their multiple-strike capability, SS-18's cannot be recognized by the U.S. ABM system. In other words, they can achieve precisely what our nuclear weapons were created and upgraded for—the ineluctability of a counterstrike, which has for dozens of years deterred potential aggressors, and provide a guarantee to the rest of the world as to the impossibility of yet another "large-scale war."

The entry into force of START II deprives us of this guarantee. Let us recall the words of Deputy Iona Andronov. The approximately equal quantities of nuclear weapons left at the disposal of Russia and the United States are by no means equal in qualitative terms. The notorious SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), should it be fully deployed by the United States (and U.S. assurances that it gave up the idea of creating it are clearly not enough here), will intercept all the multiwarhead missiles we are left with as soon as they approach America—however hard we may try to increase the number of submarine-based missiles. We, on the contrary, will be unable to match this with regard to U.S. missiles launched from sea-based or air-based missile-armed craft: Our counterstrike doctrine in the event of a possible aggression, as is well known, called for a different "tack." Under START II, we are voluntarily relinquishing this "tack." Furthermore, we do not get anything in exchange except "the word of honor." Isn't the risk too great?

... It has been reported in the press that George Bush, pointing to the successful signing of START II, said to his loyalists during the last days of his presidency that the implementation of this treaty would guarantee the

future without fear for the United States. It seems this is really so. The treaty indeed serves the national interests of ... America.

### **START II's Economic, Political Impact Eyed**

*PM2705085193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI  
in Russian 26 May 93 p 7*

[Excerpt from "analytical review" of START II Treaty: "START II Increases Our Security"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] A group of scientists led by Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov, deputy director of the United States and Canada Institute, has prepared an analytical review of the Treaty on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms [START II], which will be submitted to the Russian Supreme Soviet. The editorial office is publishing one section of this review.

It is fairly clear today that any arms cuts, particularly such wide-ranging cuts as those envisaged by the START II Treaty, not only do not promise a short-term economic impact but, on the contrary, sometimes involve additional expense. We have to decommission and cut back around 40 submarines, around 1,500 ballistic missiles, and over 7,000 warheads. Compared with the terms of the START I Treaty, an additional 1,500-2,000 warheads [boyezaryady] must be cut back. Obviously, carrying out this work over a period of eight-10 years is an extremely costly business.

However, a whole range of other longer term considerations should be borne in mind when assessing the economic costs of the START II Treaty. It is necessary to take into consideration the fundamental point that for Russia the enshrined quotas will mainly be attained by natural wastage of weapons that have outlived their guaranteed service life. According to existing data, 74 SS-18 ICBM's (including 26 in Kazakhstan) and 92 SS-24 ICBM's (including 46 in Ukraine) are to be decommissioned early. It must be borne in mind that over 2,000 missiles are to be decommissioned in the period under review because they have outlived their guaranteed service life. In addition, during the same period, around 450 SS-25 ICBM's and around 300 submarine-launched ballistic missiles will need a mid-life update [neobkhodimo budet dostroit]. But even for those missiles that we will have to decommission early, this expenditure should not be considered a net loss since the saving on operational costs will be considerable.

It can be concluded that a large proportion of the money that Russia will have to spend on dismantling and destroying nuclear arms in connection with the START II Treaty during this period would have been spent anyway, whereas the material and financial resources that would have been expended on maintaining today's levels of strategic offensive arms can be considered the direct positive economic return from the treaty.

The treaty allows a fairly sizable number of ICBM's to be destroyed by being used as space launch vehicles. This use promises an extremely large economic return. Russia is today faced with the extremely urgent task of creating a modern infrastructure and above all modernizing information and communications systems. One of the most promising avenues in the development of this sector is the creation of low-orbit satellite systems. Throughout the world one of the main factors holding back the development of systems of this kind remains the high cost of putting such satellites into near-earth orbits. The use of decommissioned ICBM's, primarily our heavy missiles, for this purpose could be an important factor enabling Russia to make a breakthrough in this area, ultimately providing an economic return far in excess of all the costs involved in the strategic offensive arms cuts.

Apart from the obvious impact on Russian-U.S. relations, this agreement has a whole range of other positive elements.

It will effectively be the first agreement that really brings about strategic offensive arms cuts, not only quantitative but also qualitative cuts (in terms of combat effectiveness indicators). As already pointed out, the new treaty enshrines a new structure for nuclear deterrence in keeping with the changed political situation and the developing partnership relations between Russia and the United States.

The START II Treaty establishes and enshrines approximate parity between Russia and the United States—with 3,000-3,500 warheads each. That is eight-10 times more than those of such great powers as China, France, and Britain.

Thus, even after cutting strategic arms by a factor of three in comparison with the current level and by a factor of two in comparison with the START I Treaty, we will still keep approximate parity with the strongest power in the world.

This is very important in terms of our retaining a worthy place in the system of international relations. Until we have revived our economic might, the strategic nuclear forces will help us to guarantee our national security for the transitional period at least. Incidentally, that will enable us to cut back the conventional armed forces, which swallow over 90 percent of military expenditure.

The agreement will act as a base to involve the other nuclear powers more actively in the reduction process and should also be an important factor in reinforcing the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Last, one of the most important aspects of this agreement is the fact that it creates a clear international-legal context for the elimination by the year 2003 of all nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan and Ukraine (since all the weapons deployed there are MIRVed ICBM's). At any rate any maneuvers made by these countries' leaderships on questions pertaining to the future of the

former USSR's nuclear weapons deployed there pose a direct threat to the implementation of START II and should meet with a quite clear, negative response from the United States and other countries of the world community.

The treaty creates preconditions for the most speedy clarification of the problem of the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy. The START II Treaty's main political importance is that it clearly makes Russia the sole heir to the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

#### **Moscow Keeping 'Watchful Eye' on DPRK Nuclear Issue**

SK2705015093 Seoul YONHAP in English 0126 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Moscow, May 26 [date as received] (YONHAP)—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said Wednesday [26 May] that Russia considered cooperative relations with South Korea important and was looking forward to developing as much bilateral cooperation in the military field as in the political and economic sectors.

He also told new Korean Ambassador to Moscow Kim Sok-kyu that the North Korean decision to leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] was "worth condemnation" and that he was keeping a watchful eye on the North Korean nuclear issue.

On prospects for military cooperation between Korea and Russia, Grachev said that the two countries had made a big stride in a short time by concluding a protocol on military cooperation and termed it a "good start."

Grachev added that he expected the two countries to cooperate more closely not only in military exchanges but in the defense industry.

He expected his Korean counterpart, Kwon Yong-hae, to visit Russia in the near future and predicted that exchanges of naval vessels and military delegations would be made soon in accordance with the protocol on Korea-Russia military cooperation.

A visit of Korean naval vessels to the Russian Far East port of Vladivostok was scheduled for April but delayed due to the trouble caused by North Korea's decision to leave the NPT. It is now set for July, informed sources say.

Meanwhile, an official at the Defense Ministry said that Moscow wouldn't extend any support to North Korea for nuclear development even after North Korea's NPT problem was resolved peacefully.

#### **Chemical Weapons Stored in Udmurtia To Be Destroyed**

PM2705113393 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 May 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Mustard Gas on the Roadside"]

[Text] There are 7,700 tonnes of liquid toxins (such as lewisite, mustard gas, and lewisite-mustard gas compounds) stockpiled in Russia. This was announced by German Frizorger of the Udmurt Council of Ministers staff. He noted that the bulk of these toxins (6,400 tonnes) are located in the city of Kambarka (Udmurtia). Owing to the transportation difficulties the Russian Government plans to set up facilities to destroy the toxins near the city itself.

#### **Defense Enterprises Open Exhibition in UK**

LD2405161093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1000 GMT 24 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Aleksandr Sisnev and Viktor Solomin]

[Text] Birmingham, 24 May—After many months of thorough preparations, the "Conversion-93" exhibition opened at the national exhibition center in Birmingham, a British industrial town, today. Specimens of the output of Russia's leading defense enterprises are being displayed there. The exhibition is intended for specialists only, and was opened by Helen Sharman, Britain's first woman-cosmonaut.

"Conversion-93" created a stir long before its exhibits were brought here. This is not surprising: after all, it deals with the output of Russia's major military factories and centers. It is no accident that some journalists have described the exhibition as "the sale of Cold War secrets." But Russian representatives have assured an ITAR-TASS correspondent that there is no question of secrets. "Like any civilized country, one of them said, we keep some of our inventions and latest equipment secret."

Although the technology and specimens shown at the exhibition have been developed by Russia's military-industrial complex, they are destined for civilian use. Yuriy Glybin, deputy head of the Russian Federation committee for defense industries, who has arrived in Birmingham, told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that the exhibition is intended to show Western firms the Russian military sector's vast potential to work for peaceful production. Yu. Glybin did not hide the fact that in Birmingham Russian military enterprises will not only show their potential but also hope to find buyers for their output. We have come to establish links, and agree on possible transactions and joint work, he said.

But not everybody sees "Conversion-93" as a purely business industrial exhibition. Before it opened, rumors circulated to the effect that transactions on deliveries of

modern military technologies and even arms to "dictatorial regimes" will be concluded at the exhibition. The exhibition organizers, both Russian and British, have categorically rejected such allegations. Moreover, as has transpired, special precautionary measures will be taken to verify the background of the companies showing interest in defense output.

### Senior Officer Assails Ukrainian Nuclear Arms Stance

93WC0074A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian  
No 53, 15 May 93

[Article by Maj. Gen. Vladimir Belous, head of the Military Policy Research Sector under the Committee of Scientists for Global Security, and candidate of technical sciences: "They Have Not Yet Mellowed..."]

[Text] *Late last year at the initiative of the Swedish Parliament Stockholm was the site of the International Conference on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Accidental Nuclear Conflict. General attention was attracted to a speech by prominent American expert M. Intriligator, who presented a scale of priorities with regard to threats to the nuclear nonproliferation system. Heading that list were the nuclear weapons of Ukraine and Kazakhstan.*

In the course of discussion Kazakhstan's representative was able to present a number of convincing facts attesting to his republic's policy of disarmament. At the same time harsh criticism was leveled at Ukraine's position, and the subsequent discussion conclusively demonstrated that the world community will never tolerate its nuclear ambitions, nor will it permit the emergence of a sixth nuclear state. The evolution of Ukrainian leaders' views on the issue of the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, which has been ongoing since Ukraine proclaimed its state independence right up to the present day, is a classic example of political juggling and a failure to understand the realities that exist in the world today.

Recently its parliament has with all seriousness been debating various legal maneuvers that would permit the republic to become a member of the nuclear club. Assertions are being made that under the 1978 Vienna Convention on Legal Succession Ukraine does in fact have every right to inherit the former USSR's nuclear status. In addition, it has been stated that the republic is in effect already a nuclear state and that there exist no international legal acts that would bar it from establishing that status *de jure*—and that Ukraine's nuclear weapons-free status as proclaimed in its July 1990 Declaration of Independence and subsequent international pledges signed by its president represent nothing more than political statements of intention.

A statement issued by the Russian Government on 5 April expressed serious concern over complication of the situation surrounding nuclear weapons located in

Ukraine. The negotiations being conducted by delegations from Moscow and Kiev have essentially come to an impasse.

Wherein lies the danger of Kiev's policy? Why is world public opinion so unyielding with regard to its nuclear ambitions?

This is primarily due to the fact that the tremendous destructive power contained in the nuclear warheads deployed on strategic launchers makes the boundary between peace and war very fragile and undependable.

One of the most important documents regulating relations between states in this area is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The treaty, which has been signed by over 150 states, expires in 1995, and currently preparations being made for an international conference devoted to the subsequent fate of the document are in their final stages. A majority of states favor extension of the treaty. However, a number of countries regard it as discriminatory and are willing to put up a fight at the conference.

As is well known, the nuclear states are those which carried out nuclear weapons tests prior to 1 January 1967: the United States, the USSR (now Russia), England, France, and the PRC. Other countries have signed the treaty as nonnuclear countries. By signing it, those countries sacrifice a portion of their sovereignty in order to strengthen peace and international security. And that is quite well-founded: the results of mathematical modeling of the world situation indicate that if the number of nuclear states were to expand to seven or eight the probability of a suicidal conflict would increase several times over.

Against this backdrop the position taken by Kiev—saying that it desires a nonnuclear status yet in fact engaging in various maneuvers to legitimize its possession of nuclear weapons—looks particularly unseemly. Some analysts have flatly stated that Kiev's maneuvers played a significant role in the decision by the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to unilaterally abrogate the treaty. Seeing the example of Ukraine, which the world community has since February 1992 been vainly attempting to bring to its senses, Pyongyang became convinced that warnings were the only sanctions it would face. Furthermore, Ukraine's nuclear policy is aimed at gaining certain political and economic dividends. And it is a well-known fact that a bad example is contagious.

Kiev's nuclear arsenal, 1,240 nuclear warheads on ICBMs and 600 warheads carried by bombers, would automatically make the republic number three in the world nuclear weapons hierarchy. This would result in a marked destabilization of the strategic situation and the arms race in the other nuclear countries and would prompt "threshold" states to secretly manufacture such weapons.

It can be predicted with a great deal of probability that if Kiev does not fulfill its obligation to eliminate all the nuclear weapons temporarily in its possession by 1997, then the fate of the Nonproliferation Treaty could be very problematic.

Indeed, if Ukraine is allowed to do this, then why not India and Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina, Libya and Iraq as well?

There is one other problem connected with nuclear weapons. In the former Soviet Union the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons went hand in hand with creation of the entire essential infrastructure and a reliable nuclear safety system which was given priority from the very start. The USSR painstakingly and with great difficulty developed a system that successfully combined scientific-technical and organizational measures with a high degree of implementation discipline. As a result, over a period of over 40 years there was not a single case of an accidental nuclear warhead detonation, even one that did not involve a chain reaction. There were two such incidents in the United States.

The situation worsened markedly with the collapse of the USSR. The unified security system was destroyed and functional communications were disrupted, with some links in the system lost.

Russia was in a somewhat better position. Its territory contains all the enterprises that produce weapons-grade fissionable materials, the plants that assemble, disassemble, and regularly service nuclear weapons, and the design bureaus and research institutes active in this field. This makes it possible to ensure a high degree of reliability and safety in connection with Russia's nuclear weapons, as well as those located in Kazakhstan and Belarus. Appropriate agreements that are being successfully implemented have been concluded with those countries.

The situation with Ukraine is completely different. Ukraine has declared the nuclear weapons deployed in its territory to be its property. Illegal actions such as that prevent Russian experts from being able to carry out required servicing and replacement of nuclear warheads.

Their guaranteed service life, depending on the model, is 10-15 years.

At the present time a significant portion of the warheads in question have already exceeded their guaranteed service life. Moreover, delays in scheduled maintenance work on them and their strategic launchers have further reduced these weapons' reliability and safety. Disruption of the maintenance schedule for nuclear missiles has become commonplace in Ukraine. For example, the Pervomayskaya Division has 40 SS-24 launch vehicles; of these, 16 have been in service eight-10 months beyond their planned service life. At the 20 launch sites under that same division automated security and defense systems have been out of commission for a long period of

time, facilitating penetration of the sites by intruders. The list of examples goes on.

The republic's leaders regard nuclear weapons primarily as a political tool, not realizing that they are a thing of extremely great potential danger. According to experts, the likelihood of the accidental triggering of a single nuclear weapon if all planned maintenance work is done on it, is between  $10^{-5}$  and  $10^{-6}$  annually. However, if there is disruption of the regular service schedule this figure could decrease by one or two magnitudes. That means that considering the total number of warheads (approximately 1,800) the probability of the accidental triggering of at least one nuclear warhead over a period of one or two years is very high. This gives the impression that in Kiev's pursuit of the nuclear phantom no thought was given to the possibility of that tragic outcome.

Due to this type of unilateral actions by the Ukrainian leadership there is also a growing threat of accidental nuclear conflict resulting from unsanctioned actions by personnel.

As is well known, the republic has established a "Center for the Administrative Control of Ukrainian Defense Ministry Strategic Nuclear Forces," and that center has command of the 43d Missile Army and the 46th Air Army, as well as nuclear technical support units.

The officers on duty at command posts are subordinate to Kiev, but operational orders originate in Moscow.

A by no means rhetorical question: What would those officers do and whose orders would they obey in an extreme situation, something against which we have no guarantee? This type of dual command creates the threat of unsanctioned, mistaken, or accidental actions with unpredictable consequences.

Nor has Kiev given serious thought to possible cases of nuclear terrorism, something that cannot be ruled out in view of the current wave of nationalism, particularly in the republic's western oblasts.

The decreased reliability of security at nuclear forces launch sites and sites where nuclear warheads are stored, plus the manning of the units in question with Ukrainian citizens exclusively, is creating the proper conditions for possible penetration by intruders. By utilizing bribery, deception, or threats they could gain access to nuclear weapons, with the most dire consequences.

Kiev's assurances that it is renouncing possession of nuclear weapons are accompanied by numerous conditions, and one can only be amazed at the ingenuity demonstrated by Ukrainian politicians in order to camouflage their true objectives.

Among those conditions are special guarantees of security and territorial integrity, the absence of political or economic pressure, compensation for the fissionable materials contained in the warheads, economic assistance from the West for the purpose of disarmament

(\$1.5-2.5 billion), guarantees that all the nuclear weapons removed from Ukraine will be dismantled, etc. And that is just for starters: the Ukrainian leadership is unwilling to part with them, as was convincingly demonstrated by the republic Supreme Soviet's condemnation of the START I Treaty.

It appears that the time has come when the world community must take collective measures of a political, diplomatic, and economic nature to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation system, increase security, improve the international climate, and increase mutual trust and predictability. There is no reasonable alternative on this issue.

### Scientists Claim Red Mercury 'Simply Does Not Exist'

PM2105142593 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 19 May 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report by E. Guretskaya and A. Gorzhevskiy, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [190342] [Announcer to camera] Increasingly of late there have been reports in the news media about attempts to sell a strategic raw material known as "red mercury" on the black market. At the same time scientists—physicists and chemists—have told us repeatedly that, even if red mercury does exist, it does not exist in the quantities claimed in, among others, Vesti newscast reports. Today we turn to a very authoritative scientist and ask him to elaborate.

[Professor V. Skorinov, identified by caption] Having studied this question in detail, we believe that a compound with the specific physical and chemical properties claimed by commercial structures which are trying to sell this substance simply does not exist.

[Guretskaya over video of laboratory scenes] Professor Skorinov is the most competent specialist who can provide exhaustive information on this subject, and the Academy of Sciences Institute of General Inorganic Chemistry, which he represents, is well informed even about potential new substances, not to mention existing ones.

Incidentally, if the Ministry of Security wanted to know what this is all about, it is here that they should have turned. But the last time information on this subject was requested was at the end of 1991. And the answer given then was very clear and seemed to satisfy everyone at the time. After all, there is no arguing with a categorical "no."

So there is little joy for those who would like to make money by any means available. And as for who sold what and to whom—the scientists are simply too busy to be interested. And they would appreciate if people did not

bother them with such questions in the future. [190505] [video shows laboratory scenes, interview]

### Deputy Prime Minister Denies Involvement in Missile Smuggling Case

MK2205072093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 21 May 93 p 14

[Crime Department-signed report: "Georgiy Khizha Testifies at Investigation. Former Deputy Prime Minister Denies Involvement in Smuggling"]

[Text] The shocking story of the involvement of former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Georgiy Khizha and his staffers in a criminal lawsuit filed by the Russian Main Military Prosecutor's Office with regard to large-scale smuggling of missile weaponry from Russia has evoked a mixed reaction among Russia's government officials and parliamentarians. Khizha's alleged involvement in the scandal will benefit the Russian Government, and Viktor Chernomyrdin in particular, because it excludes Khizha from the list of candidates for the prime ministership in the future. On the other hand, this is a blow to the Russian Supreme Soviet, which actively lobbied for Georgiy Khizha's candidacy at the latest election of Russia's head of government. The investigation is being supervised by Russian General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov. KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts point out that this is the first case related to arms smuggling from Russia that includes the names of civil servants. Yesterday, however, Georgiy Khizha's press service denied his alleged involvement in the smuggling.

Aleksandr Kobzar, deputy chief of the Investigation Administration of the Russian Main Military Prosecutor's Office, told your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent that on 19 May a meeting of top officials of the Military Prosecutor's Office took place, which decided to set up a specialized inquiry group to investigate the incident. No details were given owing to the confidentiality of the information. Russian General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov confirmed the report that a lawsuit has been filed to that effect, but also declined to comment on the case.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY has learned from reliable sources that the lawsuit was filed on 17 May with regard to a consignment of "surface-to-surface" and "air-to-air" missiles smuggled from Russia; the consignment was about to be transported to South Africa by Il-76 transport plane (KOMMERSANT-DAILY does not yet know the quantity and the exact value of the missiles). The key Russian exporters specializing in arms trade have nothing to do with the deal. Furthermore, Georgiy Khizha, who was dismissed from his post of Russian deputy prime minister last week, and a number of his staffers are to be summoned as witnesses in the case (this was also confirmed by the Russian general prosecutor's office).

Georgiy Khizha, who was deputy prime minister beginning May 1992, was in charge of the Russian defense

sector and, among other things, handled issues of conversion and the privatization of military-industrial enterprises, as well as arms exports via specialized exporters. He devised an extensive program calling for conversion and, later, the privatization and transformation of defense enterprises into joint-stock companies. This was to be financed via proceeds from arms exports. This was confirmed via talks held recently by Khizha with the Kuwaiti deputy foreign minister, and via his address to the European Parliament, in which he tried to convince Western investors to assist Russia in converting its defense enterprises to civilian uses and privatizing them. Georgiy Khizha did not manage, however, to carry through what he had planned.

The official statement distributed by Georgiy Khizha's press service for the mass media says that on 18 May the former deputy prime minister indeed met with one of the investigators conducting the inquiry and gave him explanations on the matters in his sphere of expertise (your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent was not told what particular questions were asked). The press service did not have any information on Georgiy Khizha's being summoned as a witness in the case. Moreover, Georgiy Khizha himself believes that with regard to this case the press is trying to create a scandal out of thin air.

The official deadline for completing the investigation is 19 July. KOMMERSANT-DAILY will report its results on 20 July or earlier, if fresh details of the incident come to its knowledge.

[Article includes the following boxed passage]

#### **Formerly, Arms Dealers Were Caught While Taking Bribes**

KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts note that the criminal lawsuit filed with regard to the smuggling of "surface-to-surface" and "air-to-air" missiles is the first case of this kind in Russia. Formerly (in November 1992), the Russian Security Ministry filed a lawsuit against the employees of Spetsvneshtekhnika, a firm specializing in arms exports, but the case was closed due to lack of evidence. KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts rule out the possibility that government authorities took part in the deal and that Georgiy Khizha was involved in the case: to all appearances, the case boils down to illegal arms exports via private firms.

#### **Sanctions for Illegal Export of Strategic Goods Beefed Up**

PM2605111793 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 22 May 93 p 4

["Own information" report under "From Official Sources" rubric: "You Will Not See Freedom for Ages If You Export the Wrong Thing in Circumvention of the Law"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet has adopted the law "On Making Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code" concerning the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The amendments are mainly aimed at protecting Russia's state interests when carrying out foreign economic activity in respect of exports of raw materials, semimanufactures, equipment, technologies, and scientific and technical information which could be used in the creation of arms and military hardware. Criminal liability for the illegal export of such goods is established.

In particular, punishment is envisaged for persons who engage in illegal export of semimanufactures, equipment, and services which could be used in the creation of nuclear, chemical, and other types of weapons of mass destruction or missiles for delivering them. The penalty is imprisonment for three to eight years with or without confiscation of property. Or a fine of up to 75 times the minimum wage.

#### **Pretrial Investigation of Mirzayanov**

##### **Case Ends**

PM2505144693 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
20 May 93 First Edition p 6

[Valeriy Rudnev report: "Chemical Weapons Secrets in Materials of Criminal Case and in Reports of International Conference"]

[Text] On 19 May a strange coincidence brought together two disparate events, which were, however, united by a single topic—the problem of destroying chemical weapons.

This was the last day of the investigation into the case of Dr. of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov, former employee of the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, accused by Russian state security of divulging a state secret about the production of combat toxins. This day also saw the opening in Moscow of the First International Conference on Chemical Disarmament, whose decisions, according to Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, will assist Russia in fulfilling its program for the destruction of toxins.

We have written repeatedly about the progress of the investigation into V. Mirzayanov's case. The last time we reported that the chemical scientist would not be familiarized with the secret normative acts on whose basis criminal proceedings were being instituted. Mirzayanov lodged a protest in that regard and refused to answer the investigator's questions.

Much has changed since then. Mirzayanov has continued publicly exposing the military-chemical complex and its deviations from international accords on chemical disarmament. The scientist has been awarded the prestigious prize of the U.S. Cavallo charitable foundation for his courage—his warning of the menacing danger enshrined in the development of new types of combat toxins (the prize will be presented in Washington

9 June). A committee of U.S. scientists has asked the president and the general prosecutor of Russia to protect Mirzayanov from prosecution by investigative organs. Finally, the courageous chemical scientist received an invitation to the Moscow International Conference on Chemical Disarmament.

What about the criminal case? On 13 May Mirzayanov was shown the final version of the charge—he had reported to a number of persons and published in the press data which he had learned during work at the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry relating to the creation of a new toxin in the said institute and the development of binary weapons on its basis, at the same time divulging top-secret information constituting a state secret about the latest achievements in the sphere of science and technology (the results of scientific research in the interests of the country's defense), which make it possible to enhance the potential of existing arms (ammunition), and also about the thrust and the results of applied scientific research work on the creation of binary weapons, which is being done in the interests of the country's defense."

On 17 May Mirzayanov and Aleksandr Asnis, his attorney, were told of the ending of the preliminary investigation and were shown all the materials of the criminal case so as to familiarize themselves with them.

Commenting on these materials, Mirzayanov declared: The charge is built on a one-sided assessment by experts invited from the system of the military-chemical complex. Even they admitted, however, that my public statements entailed no adverse consequences for Russia's defense capability. At the same time a number of experts in the case insist that the information divulged by the accused constitutes a state secret. But two experts—General Vadim Smirnitkiy and Colonel Nikolay Chugunov—hold a dissenting opinion: Mirzayanov did not transgress the bounds of state secrecy laid down in normative acts.

Among the other material circumstances which influenced the investigative organs' decision Mirzayanov named secret government decrees and departmental instructions. According to the accused, they are imperfect and permit an arbitrary interpretation of his actions. But the Russian Federation Government decree of 30 March 1993, which was adopted after the preliminary investigation was already in train, makes a substantial correction to them. "You get the impression," Mirzayanov commented, "that the government decision was adopted specially for my case. It was adopted in order to facilitate the task of the investigation and to put me in the dock. My case is designed to intimidate democratically minded scientists in our country. The decision of the Security Ministry's investigative organs discredits our state's policy in the eyes of the world community."

Attorney Asnis' comment was brief: Mirzayanov's guilt has not been proven. I am counting on a fair decision by the court.

### Interview With Mirzayanov

*MK2705115493 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 22, 30 May 93 (Signed to Press 25 May) pp C10, 11*

[Interview with V.S. Mirzayanov, doctor of chemical sciences charged with disclosing state secrets, by Leonard Nikishin, published in the "Court" column: "Disarmament or Modernization?" date, place not given—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] [Nikishin] Vil Sultanovich, what charge has been leveled against you?

[Mirzayanov] Frankly, I was surprised by its wording. In fact, a totally new charge has been leveled against me. Up to now I have been charged with revealing state secrets about the links between the developers and producers of chemical weapons, that is to say, between the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Defense Chemical Technology and the related plants, as well as information concerning the links between the developers and the testing sites. These charges were dropped, but in their place a new charge was formulated (in the presence of prosecutor V. Buyvolov), that I have disclosed information constituting state secrets "in the sphere of the latest scientific and technical advances in the interests of the country's defense." In addition, I, in the opinion of the prosecutors, have also divulged information "about the directions of R&D work in the interests of national defense," in other words, about the creation of binary weapons. Experts say that my information corresponds to reality, since a new substance has been created—and on its basis a binary chemical weapon. The indictment is based on the provisions under paragraph 56 of the "Provisional List of Information Constituting State Secrets," which went into effect as of 1 January 1993.

This paragraph talks about "the results of targeted R&D programs" that constitute a state secret.

The prosecutors point out that I have revealed absolutely secret information to Professor Lev Fedorov, and that in conjunction with him we have published these data in MN and also reported them to a BALTIMORE SUN correspondent and published an article in that newspaper.

We also read the list of state secrets of 1980 and the departmental list of state secrets of the Petrochemical Industry Ministry of 1991.

[Nikishin] But Russia has signed an international convention on stopping the development, production, and testing of chemical weapons. They only have to be destroyed step by step. What possible state secrets could be involved then?

[Mirzayanov] Why are you surprised? Security Ministry investigator Shkarin at an interrogation on 13 May suddenly showed me and my lawyer the 30 May 1993 Council of Ministers decree signed by Chernomyrdin which said that information about research projects on

chemical weapons, their makeup, and technology that were conducted earlier are referred to as state secrets. It was this decree that was used by the experts since the "Lists" do not contain a single word about poisonous substances or chemical weapons. Colonel Funygin, an expert from the general staff, tried to prove, however, that the word "ammunition" contained there incorporates chemical weapons, but this assertion holds no water.

[Nikishin] Excuse me, but how is it possible to accuse you of revealing information in September 1992 based on a Council of Ministers decree of March 1993? This is pure nonsense....

[Mirzayanov] That was precisely why it was adopted. You do not understand? Now the experts on my "case" are saying that this decree "clarifies" paragraph 56 of the "Provisional List."

Of course, I lodged a protest on that count, but is it my personal fate that is involved here? This is a total discrediting of Russia in the eyes of the world community! A legal foundation is being created for a new spiral of chemical armaments. The question arises: How is it possible to destroy chemical weapons if everything that has been done so far is declared a state secret?

I am ready to go to prison if only people in this country and the world community understand what they are dealing with: our military chemical complex is not even thinking of disarming itself—it only wants to get rid of the old junk.

[Nikishin] Only recently, however, an international conference on chemical disarmament was held in Moscow and was welcomed by the president himself. Did you and Professor Fedorov take part in it?

[Mirzayanov] You must be joking.... IZVESTIYA made a mistake in this case. B. Garrett from the United States, a member of the organizing committee of that conference, came out with the initiative to invite Professor Fedorov and myself so as to give us the floor. The top generals rejected that initiative out of hand: "That would not be conducive to the smooth running of the process." Nonetheless on 20 May Sebja Hawkins, a coordinator from the U.S. Greenpeace Pacific movement, told the conference that she would not be able to leave Moscow with a clear conscience without protesting the arrest and persecution of Vil Mirzayanov. And imagine, one U.S. delegate was concerned whether that statement was not too sharp....

[Nikishin] I remember how carefully the West was picking and choosing words to express protests to Brezhnev and his entourage over the harassment of dissidents....

[Mirzayanov] Of course, as far as our generals are concerned, it is like trying to get blood out of a stone. Valeriy Menshikov, a member of the organizing committee and deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme

Soviet committee on ecology, also interceded on my behalf and also met with a unanimous rebuff. This is hardly surprising, given that the organizing committee included chiefs of main directorates, generals, such scientists as Kabachnik and Fokin, who received Lenin Prizes for developing chemical weapons (the actual work, however, was done by other people).

Yet I am not sorry since no really serious problems were discussed at the conference—it looked more like a show.

[Nikishin] And yet clearly the "chemistry" generals are enjoying full support of the Russian Government....

[Mirzayanov] Yes, I also think so now. In the past I had some illusions. I have the impression that it is not Yeltsin who controls them, but they control him. Otherwise why would put his authority at risk?

[Nikishin] Presumably, there are some "ulterior" considerations involved here?

[Mirzayanov] There certainly are. There is a kind of "agreement" between the military-chemical complexes of the United States and Russia. The Americans employed in the military-industrial complex have found themselves out of job, and they need orders. At this point our generals raised the clamor about Russia's not being able to cope with destroying the chemical weapons on its own and that it would need at least \$600 million to do so. They intend to get this sum from the United States via Yeltsin. And the chances are that they will get it since the money will go for orders for the U.S. military-industrial complex to work out technology to eliminate chemical weapons in this country. But this "elimination," as conceived by the generals (in Cheboksary, for instance, there is a plant producing phosphorous-organic pesticides), would make it possible to preserve and upgrade the production of binary chemical weapons. This is the aim—to finance the dismantling of obsolete stocks and to continue manufacturing binary weapons....

We have something to work on; we have developed a new substance whose formula is being kept secret from the "outsiders," and there are semifinished products. And who can oversee all this? Now do you understand the meaning of the 30 March 1993 Russian Council of Ministers decree?

[Nikishin] Have you familiarized yourself with the case file?

[Mirzayanov] I have not even begun yet. A whole mass of problems are involved. Most of the documents cited are classified. In the course of the investigation several times more has been "disclosed" than I have "divulged." The "lists" that I was shown are also top secret. And they are extremely comprehensive. They say, for example, that information about the nuclear capacity of the world's leading powers is top secret! Under these regulations any person could be imprisoned for any reason. Moreover, they contain an addition: "And for other actions." In sum, total arbitrariness.

I also noticed manipulation in working with the experts. The above-mentioned paragraph 56 of "The List" talks about "targeted programs." Yet the experts struck these words out, leaving in only the phrase "research projects." But even washing the glassware in chemical laboratories could be subsumed under "research." Why was the reference to "targeted programs" omitted? Because none of the experts has ever seen any of these targeted programs. I demanded: Prove to me that what I have written in MN coincides with what is said about targeted programs, and add that to the file. What kind of expert examination would that be without this then?

[Nikishin] Is there really nothing else except your personal courage that could be set against the omnipotence of the "chemistry generals"?

[Mirzayanov] I have had contacts with Aleksey Yablokov, the president's adviser on ecology, and I took part in preparing the presidential statement of 20 April this year on problems of dismantling chemical weapons. Yet this document does not address many fundamental issues, especially insofar as the security of destroying chemical weapons is concerned. My aim was to pacify the population of the Volga region, Chuvashia, Udmurtia, and Tataria, but it has not been achieved. [Mirzayanov ends]

P.S. The president's statement of 20 April says: "Mountains of the now useless and dangerous chemical weapons is the heavy legacy of our past. Russia must get rid of it in the interests of its own security and in the interests of the security of the entire world." Esteemed Mr. President, what is Vil Mirzayanov going to be tried for then? Recently the scientist has been awarded a prize by the American Cavallo Foundation "For Moral Courage" as a tribute to his contribution to the struggle for eliminating chemical weapons. The presentation ceremony is to take place in Washington on 9 June. But to whom will it be presented?

Vil Mirzayanov himself, who is under investigation, may not leave Moscow. At the same time his wife, who was planning to attend the ceremony in the United States, has been refused a foreign passport. Just like in the good old days....

## ESTONIA

### Purchase of Israeli Missile Systems Kept 'Secret'

WS2405081893 Tallinn BNS *BALTIC BUSINESS WEEKLY* in English 2224 GMT 23 May 93

[Text] Estonia has taken into use weapons corresponding to the NATO standards: Last Monday, the first consignment of weapons bought from Israel arrived in Tallinn.

Israel will sell to Estonia weapons for USD 50 mln. Estonia buys missile systems, anti-aircraft guns, bomb throwers, light machine guns, precision guns, revolvers, and ammunition.

The Israeli national munition concern will sell the weapons to Estonia "on the hire purchase". The deed of purchase was signed in January but the transaction was kept secret on request of the Israeli government until the first consignment reached Tallinn.

It is the first major weapons purchase contract of Estonia. Earlier, the Estonian Defence Forces had brought Kalashnikov automatics produced in Romania, and some arms produced in Russia.

The West has refused to sell weapons to Estonia saying it is a crisis region.

The one-before-the-last weekend, the arms manufacturers of South Africa demonstrated their products in the Aegviidu artillery range. The new commander of the Estonian Defence Forces said that weapons will be bought from China, too.

## UKRAINE

### Parliament Urged To Ratify Start I

AU2705110493 Kiev *HOLOS UKRAYINY* in Ukrainian 26 May 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "For Nonnuclear Integrity"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Peace Council and the Ukrainian Peace Fund have issued a statement declaring their unconditional support for the efforts of the United Nations, the Committee of Nongovernmental Organizations for Disarmament, and of other peacemaking organizations of the world that aim to achieve global disarmament proceeding from the principles of worldwide security. The statement expresses a firm determination to stand up for the three nonnuclear principles that were set forth by the Declaration of Ukraine's State Sovereignty: "Not to accept, not to manufacture, and not to purchase nuclear weapons." The Peace Council and Peace Fund called upon parliament to ratify START I and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as this will lead to an improvement in the internal political climate and to a relaxation of tension in international relations.

## FRANCE

### Construction of Third New Generation Nuclear Submarine Ordered

AU2705151693 Paris AFP in English 1506 GMT  
27 May 93

[Text] Paris, May 27 (AFP)—France has ordered construction of a third new generation, missile-launching nuclear submarine, Defence Minister Francois Leotard announced Thursday.

The new sub, named the Vigilant, will be operational in 2001 and will carry the new surface-to-surface M45 missile, Leotard told parliament.

A first sub in the series, the Triomphant, will be operational in 1996 and will be launched this summer. The second, the Temeraire, should be operational in 1998.

The 1991 cost of the subs was 89 billion francs (16 billion dollars) each, on the basis of a total order of five vessels. The figure has since been reduced to four.

The development and industrial cost of the whole programme was estimated at 89 billion francs (16 billion dollars) in 1991.

Leotard also said the land army would be cut by 45,000 men to 225,000 by 1997. French forces of 2,400 men, their families and support civilians would be withdrawn from Berlin, a submarine base closed in Lorient, west France, and an air base shut down at Nimes, in the south.

Two conventional Daphne submarines will be transferred from Lorient to the Mediterranean base of Toulon and four of the Agosta type to Brest, Leotard said.

## GERMANY

### Technology Minister Advocates Practice-Oriented Research

AU2305172393 Hamburg DIE WELT in German  
22 May 93 p 2

[Diethart Goos report: "Research Minister Struggles for Made in Germany"]

[Text] Neubrandenburg—Without ambitious projects and high-flying plans, Paul Krueger, new FRG minister

for research and technology, is off to work. The principles of the Christian Democratic Union politician from Neubrandenburg in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania are practice and application-oriented and financially realistic, as he explained to DIE WELT.

For Paul Krueger, research promotion is the most important future investment. "Therefore, I hope that the financial scope of my ministry that was at the disposition of my predecessors, Heinz Riesenhuber and Matthias Wissmann, will at least be maintained. Putting it cautiously, I hope that we will not have to make cuts, despite the strained federal budget."

It is decisive for Krueger that, in view of increasing foreign competition, the good trademark "Made in Germany" will not lose ground. "In the field of basic research, we continue to be among the top nations. However, we must not lose sight of the implementation, the field of practical application." Also, one should not only concentrate on innovative products that can be exported. Central fields of life, such as environment and health, must be considered more in research work. There is a considerable pent-up demand, above all in the new laender, from which only 2.5 percent of the innovative export products presently come, he said.

Money alone is not decisive. "Rather, we must fill the people with more enthusiasm for research and development." In the eastern German laender, the Academy of Sciences is dominant in the field of research, while research close to industry has fallen behind. "Before the change, there were 130,000 employees in this sector, and now there are only 20,000."

Krueger does not want to commit himself to the future of German space research. He, however, indicates his reserve about the D-2 mission on board a U.S. space shuttle, which almost cost 1 billion German marks and was recently concluded.

"We cannot ignore the fact that 85 percent of the people reject space flights and we therefore have to consider whether they will still have a chance over the long term." When making basic decisions, one should not fail to see many positive effects of space flights, particularly in the fields of environment, transportation, and telecommunications. "On the whole, we should orientate ourselves by objectives that finally benefit the people." Krueger sees good chances to get the project of a trend-setting fusion reactor valued at billions against Japanese and American competition to Germany. However, the prerequisite is the agreement of the Social Democratic Party of Germany to nuclear fusion, he said.

**First International Conference on Chemical Disarmament Ends**

*LD2105142393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1320 GMT 21 May 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—The first international conference on chemical disarmament has completed here today.

The three-days discussion at Moscow's President Hotel attracted over 100 scientists and representatives of business and industrial communities from 25 states.

Head of the U.S. International Disarmament and Conversion Center Coel Olson told ITAR-TASS the conference was useful, as its participants exchanged opinion on a broad range of chemical disarmament problems.

In his opinion, legislation on chemical disarmament should be quickly elaborated, otherwise the industry will fail to meet the requirements of chemical disarmament programs envisaged by the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Speaking of control over the convention implementation, Olson said the inspection will be permanent and take an indefinite period of time on condition of further commercial interest of the chemical industry. He said

short-term working relations between foreign and Russian enterprises are possible.

Head of the U.N. group of chemical and biological arms experts and Swedish chemist Johan Santesson told ITAR-TASS representatives of countries, which do not have chemical arms, attended the conference because the chemical disarmament problem can be solved on a global scale only with collective efforts of the international community.

Speaking of the work in Iraq of a U.N. expert team he headed, Santesson said U.N. experience of chemical inspection can be used in future. In his opinion, it would be expedient to form small teams of experts to include not only specialists in toxic agents' destruction but also sociologists and psychologists.

Exchange of experience was good for all conference participants, secretary of the conference organizational committee Vladislav Malyshev told ITAR-TASS. A number of states, including the United States and Germany, expressed their readiness to render economic assistance to chemical disarmament in Russia.

In Malyshev's words, conference participants abstained from the adoption of an appeal to heads and public figures in states-signatories of the convention. It is not because their opinions differ, but because "some discussion participants did not consider themselves competent to adopt the appeal," said Malyshev.

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